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People often face situations with uncertain outcomes that
they cannot control but must do their best to anticipate. In
these situations, decisions about how to act in preparation
for key outcomes should depend on the likelihoods of the
key outcomes—not on the desirability of those outcomes.
Consider an example in which an employee has been
informed that there is a chance of being sent to a distant city
for a summer traineeship. Assume this employee has no say
in the matter. The employee’s decisions about how much to
prepare for that possibility (e.g., by researching apartment
availability or even placing a deposit on an apartment)
should depend on the perceived likelihood of being sent on
the traineeship—not on how attractive the employee finds
the traineeship or its location.
In this paper, we address the question of whether people
sometimes let the desirability of a key outcome influence
their actions in anticipation of it—even when they cannot
control that key outcome and desirability is therefore irrele-
vant. If desires bias preparations for an outcome, there are
two possible directions of influence. There might be an opti-
mistic desirability bias, whereby desire (dislike) for a key
outcome increases (decreases) people’s tendency to act like
it will happen, or there might be a pessimistic desirability
bias, whereby desire (dislike) for an outcome decreases (in-
creases) our tendency to act like it will happen. While there
are many studies addressing related issues (discussed later),
we do not know of any published studies that experimentally
manipulated outcome desirability to test for a biasing effect
on preparation behavior. Here, we present five such studies.
One way in which either an optimistic or pessimistic bias
in behavior might materialize is if the desirability of the
outcome biases people’s perceptions of the likelihood of
the outcome, by biasing the way people seek, interpret, or
use evidence relevant to the outcome (for an extended
discussion, see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). If outcome de-
sirability does tend to bias people’s perceptions of likelihood
in one direction or another, then it stands to reason that their
behavior would be biased in the same direction. However, in
studies that specifically examined the causal role of outcome
desirability on subjective likelihood estimates, evidence as to
whether outcome desirability inflates estimates (i.e., a desi-
rability bias/wishful thinking), deflates estimates, or has little
net impact has been mixed.1 A key conclusion from a 2007
meta-analysis of studies that experimentally manipulated
outcome desirability was that there is little overall evidence
that outcome desirability impacts likelihood estimates in
either a positive or negative direction (Krizan & Windschitl,
2007). Researchers who systematically attempted to find
evidence of wishful thinking on likelihood judgments had
—after little success—aptly described the wishful thinking
effect as “elusive” (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995). Although
some studies since this 2007 meta-analysis have revealed
significant desirability biases/wishful thinking (e.g., Lench,
2009; Windschitl, Scherer, Smith, & Rose, 2013), others
have revealed the opposite (e.g., Bilgin, 2012; Vosgerau,
2010). This has led some researchers to question whether
the desirability bias exists (Harris & Hahn, 2011; Vosgerau,
2010; see also Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995).
Despite the fact that the evidence that manipulations of
outcome desirability influence likelihood estimates is mixed,
our main prediction in the current studies was that such
manipulations would tend to affect preparation behavior in
1Most studies on optimistic biases do not specifically attempt to isolate the
causal role of outcome desirability. They leave outcome desirability as one
of multiple reasons why a stated expectation for a desired (undesired) out-
come is higher (lower) than an objective standard (for discussion, see
Windschitl & Stuart, in press; see also Krizan & Windschitl, 2007, 2009).
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of behavior, so these studies are relevant to our prediction.
However, measuring bets is only one way of operationalizing
behavior, and it may have a peculiar property in the context
of the marked-card paradigm, where both bets and desire
are defined monetarily. Betting on the undesirable outcome
would clearly be hedging or betting against the self. It would
ensure the gain of a desirable draw would be cut by the loss
from the misplaced bet. The present research does not
involve bets nor monetary manipulations. We measure
behavior that is better characterized as preparing for, or
anticipating, an outcome, rather than wagering about an
outcome.
In opposition to our main prediction, it is also possible
that outcome desirability would have no effect on behavior
or even a pessimistic effect. In our studies, the outcomes
were impending. As an outcome draws near, people may be-
come less comfortable taking an optimistic stance toward an
uncertain event, and they might even embrace a pessimistic
one (Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; Shepperd, Ouellette,
& Fernandez, 1996; Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick,
Walker, & Perez, 2000; Tyler & Rosier, 2009; for a review,
see Sweeny & Krizan, 2013). Specifically, people may strate-
gically adopt a position—that is, a subjective probability, a
prediction, or a behavior—that is pessimistic because it
would mitigate the added unpleasantness of negative out-
comes that are unexpected rather than expected (Shepperd
et al., 1996; Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006). The
concept of an asymmetric loss function is also relevant here.
Work on asymmetric loss functions suggests that people
implicitly or explicitly know that the harm of being overly
optimistic is typically greater than the harm of being overly
pessimistic—leading to a more pessimistic stance (Haselton
& Nettle, 2006; Weber, 1994; Weber & Hilton, 1990).
An entirely different reason why people might behave in a
way that appears pessimistic concerns the notion of tempting
fate. Tempting fate is the superstitious belief that it is bad
luck to behave with hubris or do something that is interpreted
as involving needless risk (e.g., a college applicant wearing a
sweatshirt from her top-choice university prior to being
offered admission; Risen & Gilovich, 2008). Some people
have the intuition that tempting fate will actually decrease
the likelihood of a desired outcome or increase the likelihood
of an undesired outcome (Miller & Taylor, 1995; Risen &
Gilovich, 2007, 2008; Swirsky, Fernback, & Sloman, 2011;
Van Wolferen, Inbar, & Zeelenberg, 2013; see also Kogut
& Ritov, 2011). Referring to our opening example about
the employee who might be assigned to a summer trainee-
ship, if that employee was impacted by tempting-fate beliefs,
he or she might be overly cautious and avoid looking at
apartments precisely because he or she desires the position
and does not want to lessen the likelihood of getting it.
Although various studies have tested when and why people
sometimes believe that tempting fate reduces the likelihood
of a desired outcome, no published studies involve the type
of tests we conducted for this paper. The typical study on
tempting fate presents people with a scenario in which a
protagonist did or did not “tempt fate,” and the dependent
measures ask people to estimate the likelihood of a desired
outcome given the protagonist’s actions (e.g., Risen &
an optimistic direction. Inspiration for this prediction comes, 
in part, from a set of studies showing that, when expectations 
are solicited in the form of dichotomous outcome predictions 
rather than in the form of likelihood estimates, manipulations 
of outcome desirability do have a significant impact (for a re-
view, see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). Many of these studies 
utilized what is called the marked-card paradigm. In that 
paradigm, initiated by Marks (1951), participants make 
predictions about whether a card—drawn from a deck with 
known numbers of marked and unmarked cards—will be 
marked. A monetary manipulation makes drawing a marked 
card desirable, neutral, or undesirable. When the proportion 
of marked cards is at or near 50%, participants are more 
likely to predict a marked card when drawing marked cards 
are desirable rather than not (e.g., Irwin, 1953; Irwin & 
Snodgrass, 1966; Lench & Ditto, 2005; Pruitt & Hoge, 
1965; for meta-analysis, see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). 
This effect of desirability on outcome predictions has been 
detected even when the same manipulations failed to produce 
detectible effects on likelihood judgments within the same 
studies (Price & Marquez, 2005; Windschitl, Smith, Rose, 
& Krizan, 2010).
Our prediction about behavior extends from an account 
suggested by Windschitl et al. (2010) for why manipulations 
of outcome desirability influence predictions—even when 
they do not influence likelihood estimates. This biased-
guessing account posits that in situations where participants 
are forced to make a subjectively arbitrary prediction (e.g., a 
dichotomous guess), they will typically guess in an optimistic 
rather than pessimistic direction. This is particularly relevant 
in situations where there is no definitive information as to 
how one should respond, such as in the marked card paradigm 
when there was an equal or roughly equal number of marked 
and unmarked cards. Likelihood judgments may be less 
vulnerable to the influence of desirability because participants 
initiate a scaling process that, under most circumstances, does 
not involve guessing. The judgments are scaled based on 
perceptions of evidential support (for an example model, see 
Tversky & Koehler, 1994), and desirability manipulations 
appear to have less impact on evidence perceptions than on 
guessing processes (see Windschitl et al., 2010, for more 
information). Here, we propose that desires will influence 
behavior in a manner similar to how, in previous work, they 
influenced predictions. Both a prediction and a behavior 
involve a choice rather than merely a judgment; they both 
involve orienting toward a particular outcome as the one that 
will presumably happen. Under some degree of evidence 
ambiguity or balance, this orienting process can involve 
guesswork and is susceptible to the influence of outcome 
desirability. Of course, if outcome desirability also influences 
perceptions of evidence, this could contribute to an effect on 
behavior.
A set of studies that used the marked-card paradigm but 
solicited bets rather than predictions lends initial yet limited 
empirical support for our prediction that behavior would be 
optimistically biased by outcome desirability (e.g., Irwin & 
Snodgrass, 1966; Morlock & Hertz, 1964). Participants bet 
more on a marked card when drawing a marked card was 
desirable rather than not. Obviously, placing a bet is a form
personally undesirable (e.g., much noise and traffic associ-
ated with public pools), and they viewed a picture of a less
attractive public pool.2 In addition, all participants learned
that if the pool is built, the city would require them to make
some landscaping changes to the back end of their yard. If
they opt to make the changes now, before the results of the
foundation testing are confirmed, they could obtain a 70%
discount on costs by using a crew that was currently
employed by a neighbor. Participants were asked “Given
the discount, would you go ahead and have the changes to
your property made even though you can’t be sure about
whether the pool would go in?” (1 = definitely would not,
2 = probably would not, 3 = probably would, 4 = definitely
would). They then completed one open-ended question re-
garding why they answered the way they did to the previous
question, a set of manipulation checks, and demographics.
Results
Three manipulation check items assessed how much the
scenario made it seem like having a pool would be desirable
and how appealing living near a public pool would be gener-
ally. These three items were significantly correlated (rs> .36,
ps< .001), and we combined them to from a composite mea-
sure. Analysis of the composite measure confirmed that we
successfully manipulated participants’ desire for the pool
(desirable M=5.17, SD=1.24; undesirable M=2.24,
SD=1.23), t(260) =19.22, p< .001, d=2.37. Analyzing each
measure independently yielded the same results.
Regarding participants’ behavior, both Mann–Whitney
and t-tests revealed the presence of a desirability bias,
U=7102.00, p< .001; t(265.21) = 3.77, p< .001, d=0.46.
As predicted, participants who read that they desired the pool
were more likely to indicate that they would make the
landscaping changes (Mdn=3, M=2.94, SD=0.72) than
did participants who read that they did not desire the pool
(Mdn=2, M=2.58, SD=0.84).
Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that, when people have an option
between preparing for a potential outcome or not, the mani-
pulated desirability of that outcome biases their preparation
choice. In this study, the direction of the bias fit optimism,
rather than pessimism or a tempting fate concern.
Concurrently with Study 1, we conducted a related study
with a separate sample of 264 participants from Mechanical
Turk. We used a similar scenario, except the pool was a
dog park (which, depending on results of environmental-
impact testing, might be built), and we did not manipulate
desirability (see Appendix B for full scenario). Instead, we
anticipated that the perceived desirability of having a dog
park constructed near one’s home would vary substantially
across people in our sample, and we therefore simply
2Because any particular pool picture may have unforeseen idiosyncrasies, we
used three pictures within each condition, but a given participant only saw
one. There was no effect of this counterbalancing factor (ps> .39), so it will
not be discussed further.
Gilovich, 2008; Swirsky et al., 2011). In other words, the 
studies did not measure people’s behavior and therefore did 
not gauge whether behavior tended to be optimistically or 
pessimistically biased. Our studies were specifically de-
signed to gauge this.
Overview of present studies and reporting standards 
We used three paradigms to conduct a series of studies. 
Study 1 assessed hypothetical behavior in an everyday sce-
nario. Studies 2 and 3 measured actual behaviors in the con-
text of a novel computer game. Studies 4 and 5 also assessed 
actual behaviors, but this time in response to the uncertain 
outcome of a videotaped basketball game. In addition to 
behavior measures, Studies 3–5 also included perceived like-
lihood measures. For each study, we set a sample-size target 
in advance and stopped data collection based on this target 
and various logistical factors (e.g., participant sign-ups and 
experimenter availability). All measures, conditions, and 
data exclusions are reported. No covariates were used.
STUDY 1
Participants in Study 1 read a hypothetical scenario about a 
potential upcoming event, described as either desirable or 
undesirable. They were then asked if they would engage in 
a behavior that involved preparing for the event or if they 
would do nothing. A tempting fate hypothesis would predict 
that for a desired event, people would hesitate to prepare for 
it, so as to not trigger its undoing. A pessimism hypothesis 
might suggest that for a desired event, people would tend 
to view the event as unlikely and therefore not prepare for 
it. Contrary to these predictions, we expected that people 
would tend to act optimistically. That is, they would be more 
likely to prepare for a desired event than an undesired one.
Method
Participants
The participants were 273 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
workers paid a small fee for their participation (62.6% male; 
13 did not provide gender; M age = 29.67, 10 did not provide 
age).
Procedure and materials
Participants read a hypothetical scenario about the potential 
installation of a public pool in the area behind their house 
(see Appendix A for full scenario). They were told that the 
determining factor for whether the pool would be located in 
that area was the results of foundation testing that had not 
yet been conducted and whose results were described as un-
certain. Half of the participants were told to imagine that they 
really wanted this pool. They also read reasons why it would 
be personally desirable (e.g., easy access for your family), 
and they viewed a picture of an attractive public pool. The 
other half of participants were told to imagine that they really 
did not want this pool. They read reasons why it would be
on the desirable side, perhaps at the cost of preparation effi-
ciency. The other alternative, of course, was that participants
would prepare more on the undesired side, reflecting a pessi-
mistic perspective or a form of hedging (i.e., ensuring that if
they miss out of a reward because the slider failed to travel to
the desired side, they would at least earn points when the
slider hits the circles they prepared on the undesired side).
Method
Participants and design
Fifty-five undergraduate students at the University of Iowa
participated. The design was a 2 (counterbalance: desirable
side on the right or left) × 5 (block: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) mixed facto-
rial. Both desirable and undesirable sides were present on
each trial.3 Each block had 10 trials. The counterbalance fac-
tor did not produce main effects or interactions and will not
be discussed further. Two exploratory blocks of trials also
appeared after the first five (see details in the “Exploratory
blocks and additional measures” section).
Procedures
The goal of the participants was to score points so they
would be eligible for a candy prize. They went through four
practice trials with extensive feedback to ensure they under-
stood the two ways in which they could win and lose points.
Next, they completed 50 real trials broken up into five blocks
of 10 trials. Each trial had the same parts. Figure 1 depicts
what participants saw immediately after clicking “go” to start
a trial. There were nine red circles randomly placed on each
side of the screen (three small, medium, and large). There
was “+500” printed on the background of one side and
“250” on the other (counterbalanced). Participants had
4.5 seconds to prepare as many circles as possible by clicking
on them, which turned them yellow. When the time expired,
a rectangular bar called a “slider” appeared at the top center
of the screen. It then immediately slid to the left or right side
of the screen (randomly determined within blocks) and then
traveled down that side. As the slider descended over the
circles on that side of the screen, it turned all the “prepared”
circles from yellow to green. The amount of points
lost/gained on the trials was immediately calculated, with
explicit labeling of how the points were lost/gained. Then
the next trial began.
About points
From the initial instructions and extensive feedback in prac-
tice and test trials, participants were well informed about the
two sources of points. First, participants either gained 500
points or lost 250 points as a function of whether the slider
picked the +500 or 250 side. This served as our desirability
manipulation. Second, participants received 25 points for
3This may be considered as another within-subject factor, but because of the
way we scored the dependent measure (creating an index that compares be-
havior on the two sides), it makes more sense to leave this factor out of the
factorial design statement.
measured subjective desirability on seven point scales. 
Dog-park desirability did indeed vary substantially. More 
important, the primary analysis produced a result consistent 
with Study 1 and a desirability bias. The more that partici-
pants desired a dog park, the more inclined they were to 
initiate the landscaping changes to their yard that would only 
be required if the dog park was built (r = .49, p < .001). 
Again, the building of the dog park depended on the results 
of environmental-impact testing. For this uncontrollable 
event, participants were more interested in preparing for the 
event if they saw it as desirable rather than undesirable.
STUDY 2
For Study 2, we developed a computer-game paradigm that 
allowed us to test actual behavior, rather than hypothetical 
behavior. During game trials, participants needed to prepare 
for an uncertain event that had two possible outcomes, one 
of which was more desirable than the other.
The details of the game are described in the “Method” 
section, so we provide only a brief overview here. Each trial 
involved a screen split down the middle, with many circles 
on each side (Figure 1). Participants knew that an unpredict-
able “slider” was about to appear and would travel down 
either the left or right side of the screen. Based on the 
desirability manipulation, participants hoped the slider would 
travel down a particular side, because this would yield a sig-
nificant point gain. However, participants also knew that they 
had a limited time to “prepare” circles for the slider (by 
clicking on them). They knew that, irrespective of whether 
the slider went left or right, they would earn points for every 
“prepared” circle that was hit by the slider. Circles differed in 
size, which affected how easy it was for participants to 
quickly prepare them with an accurately placed mouse click. 
Given this situation, the optimal strategy for the short circle-
preparation period was to start with the large/easy circles, 
irrespective of what side the participant hoped the slider 
would travel down. If, however, participants exhibited an 
optimistic desirability bias, they would tend to prepare circles
Figure 1. An example screenshot of the computer game from Study 
2. The slider is the thin green bar depicted at the top of the screen. 
After a brief period in which participants could click on circles to 
“prepare” them, the slider moved to either the left or right and slid 
down that side of the screen. Participants earned or lost points de-
pending on the side of the screen the slider went, but they also
gained points for every prepared circle that the slider hit
each circle that they had prepared on the side that was
selected by the slider.
Exploratory blocks and additional measures
When designing this study, we expected that most partici-
pants would be significantly fatigued by the end of 50 trials.
Nevertheless, for exploratory purposes, we added two addi-
tional blocks of trials. There were two types of blocks, pre-
sented in counterbalanced order. In one block, participants
gave 2 likelihood estimates at the start of every trial—the
likelihoods that the slider would chose the left and right sides
(adding to 100%). At the start of every trial in the other
block, participants predicted whether the slider would choose
the left or right side.
Participants then completed the Life Orientation Test-
Revised (LOT-R) scale (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994),
the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984), and the Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer,
2001). Scores from these scales were not significantly
correlated with our key measures and will not be discussed
further. Before being debriefed and receiving candy, partici-
pants completed an exit questionnaire with items about the
tendencies of the slider, self-perceived prediction ability,
performance and strategy changes across the course of the
session, interest and effort in the task, and speculation about
the purpose of the task. None of these items yielded results
that were important to discuss here.
Results and discussion
Within the main five blocks of trials, participants were able
to prepare an average of 8.79 (SD=0.80) circles per trial.
In order to assess whether participants were optimistically
biased in their preparation of circles, we calculated what we
will call the desirability-bias index, namely, the percentage
of prepared circles that were from the desired rather than
the undesired side (for a given trial). This index is plotted
by block in Figure 2.
In the main blocks, the overall average index was 54.3%
(SD=16.7%), which represents a marginally significant
tendency to prepare more circles on the desired side, t(54)
= 1.91, p= .06, d=0.26. On closer analysis, the bias was
robust in early blocks and tapered off in later blocks. More
specifically, an average of 59.8% (SD=15.2%) of the circles
prepared by participants in Block 1 were from the desirable
side, which was significantly above 50%, t(54) = 4.78,
p< .001, d=0.64. The desirability-bias index was also
significantly above 50% in Blocks 2 (t(54) = 2.77, p= .008,
d=0.37) and 3 (t(54) = 1.97, p= .05, d=0.27), but not in
Block 4 (t(54) = 0.52, p= .61, d=0.07) or 5 (t(54) =0.67,
p= .50, d=0.09). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) examin-
ing the desirability-bias index across the five blocks revealed
a significant main effect of block, F(2.36, 127.70) = 6.91,
p< .001, ηp2 = 0.11, indicating that there was a significant
decrease in the optimistic desirability bias over time. Other
research on the desirability bias has found similar learning
effects where the bias decreases over multiple trials
(Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995, Study 4), presumably because
participants begin to understand that their biased strategy is
not the most effective at maximizing gains.
There were also results consistent with the idea that
exhibiting a desirability bias in behavior was suboptimal. In
preliminary steps for the analyses, we computed an index of
the average size of the prepared circles (where small, medium,
and larger circles were coded as 1, 2, and 3, respectively). The
average was above 2 (M=2.37, SD=0.17, p< .001), reflecting
an overall tendency to click on larger (52%) rather than medium
(33%) or smaller (15%) circles. We also tallied the number of
circles successfully prepared. Critically, among the participants
whose desirability-bias index was in the optimistic direction
(i.e., directionally above 50%; n=34), there was a significant
inverse correlation between the desirability-bias index and
performance (i.e., number of circles prepared; r=.41,
p= .02). It appears that being more optimistically biased came
with a cost. Other correlations shed light on why. An inverse
correlation between the desirability-bias index and average-
size index (r=.53, p= .001) suggests that being biased led
to less of a strategic focus on large circles. And, a positive
correlation between the average-size index and number of
circles prepared (r= .46, p= .006) is consistent with the notion
that participants who failed to focus on clicking mostly large
circles (i.e., the easy-to-click ones) did not performwell overall.
Results from the exploratory blocks
Given that the desirability bias on behavior had diminished
and was not significant by Blocks 4 and 5, it is not surprising
that the desirability bias on behavior was also not significant
in the exploratory trials of Blocks 6 and 7 (p= .68 for the
block that included likelihood judgments; p= .41 for the
block that included outcome predictions). Average likeli-
hood judgments about whether the slider would go to a given
side were not significantly affected by the desirability of the
side (p= .84). The effect of desirability on outcome predic-
tions was significant (p= .05); the mean rate at which parti-
cipants predicted the desirable side was 56% (SD=22.6).
Figure 2. Desirability-bias index by block (Study 2). Error bars
represent ±1 standard error
desirability and focus on determining which side was more
likely in a given trial. This might happen because the
presence of objective evidence could put participants in a
more analytical mindset. If so, this would place a rather
restrictive boundary condition on the optimistic behavior
we had observed in Study 2.
Method
Participants and design
The participants were 137 undergraduates from the Univer-
sity of Iowa. The study design consisted of a 2 (order: choice
first, likelihood judgment first) × 2 (first location counter-
balance: desirable side on the left or right) × 2 (block: 1, 2)
mixed factorial with only the last factor as within subjects.
Description of game
The specific differences between Studies 2 and 3 are in con-
junction with the four differences we have already discussed
earlier.
Two practice trials were included to orient participants to
the newly added grids. Instructions emphasized the utility of
the grid: “You will see a grid that will help you predict which
side the slider…” Four additional practice trials oriented
participants to why the background of one side of the screen
said “joke” and the other “math,” and why the grid squares
contained “J” or “M.” Participants viewed two math prob-
lems that we thought most students would find aversive
and two jokes that were generally amusing.
After the instruction and practice phase, participants
engaged in 16 trials (split into two blocks of eight) of which
12 were critical trials and four were filler trials. Each trial
began with the display of a two-color grid. Again, the grid
essentially revealed the likelihood of each possible outcome
—the slider going to the math side or the joke side. The color
pairs used for the grid and sides changed from trial to trial, to
accentuate the independence of the trials. In addition to
counterbalancing whether the left or right side was initially
associated with jokes/math, this initial pairing was switched
after the first block of eight trials. In the grids for the critical
trials, the proportion of squares representing the math and
jokes sides was always 50/50. For the filler trials, the propor-
tions were either 30/70 or 70/30. We included these filler
trials so that participants would not assume that all grids have
50/50 proportions.5
After seeing the grid for a given trial, participants made
either a choice and then a likelihood judgment, or a likelihood
judgment and then a choice. As outlined earlier, we changed
behavior to a categorical choice. This meant that now parti-
cipants picked one side to prepare and then were given
4.5 seconds to click on circles only on the side they had
chosen. For the likelihood judgments, participants were asked
how likely it was that the computer would pick one side or the
5Not surprisingly, there was no evidence of a desirability bias in the filler tri-
als; the 30/70 proportions in the filler trials gave participants a relatively
strong indication as to the likely direction of the slider (also Windschitl
et al., 2010).
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we used largely the same game as in Study 2, but 
with four key changes. First, we solicited likelihood judg-
ments in addition to behaviors (in counterbalanced order). 
In the introduction of this paper, we discussed that the effect 
of outcome desirability on behavior might be robust even 
when participants’ subjective likelihood estimates are not 
affected or are much less affected. This was inspired by the 
biased-guessing account for why manipulations of outcome 
desirability influenced predictions even when they did not 
influence likelihood estimates (Windschitl et al., 2010). The 
account previously posited that, in situations where people 
must make a subjectively arbitrary prediction (e.g., a dicho-
tomous guess), they will typically guess in an optimistic 
rather than pessimistic direction. When making likelihood 
judgments, guessing is usually not a factor; the judgments 
may be less vulnerable to the influence of desirability 
because participants initiate a scaling process based on 
perceptions of evidence (Bilgin, 2012; Windschitl et al., 
2010). Given this account and empirical work already 
discussed, we expected there to be little if any effect of 
desirability on likelihood judgments, but we did expect a 
replication of the effect of desirability on behavior.4
The three remaining changes extended the generalizability 
of the findings from Study 2. For the second change, we 
made the behavioral measure a dichotomous choice. Partici-
pants now had to choose between preparing circles only on 
the desirable side or only on the undesirable side, rather than 
being able to prepare circles on both sides of the screen. For 
the third change, instead of using point gains and losses to 
manipulate the desirability of the slider going to the left or 
right sides, we told participants that depending on which side 
the slider chose, they would be required to either solve a 
difficult math problem or read a short joke (which informal 
pilot testing suggested were undesirable and desirable, 
respectively). For the fourth change, participants in Study 2 
were given more information relevant to the likelihood that 
the slider would go left or right on a given trial. They saw 
a two-color grid before each trial (Figure 3). Each color 
represented a side, and the direction of the slider on that trial 
was said to be based on the color of a randomly selected 
square from the grid on that trial. To reinforce the meanings 
of the grid squares, we also inserted a small “M” in each 
square containing the color associated with math problems 
and a “J” in each square containing the color associated with 
jokes (Figure 3). On critical trials, the grid colors always had 
proportions of 50/50, yet we assumed there would be 
trial-by-trial variation in participants’ perceptions of the 
actual proportions of these grids. We wondered whether the 
presence of the grid would cause participants to ignore
4Given our use of counterbalancing, we were also poised to examine order 
effects. It seemed possible that the magnitude of the desirability bias on 
whatever measure was asked first could carry over and influence responses 
to the second measure. For example, perhaps the act of providing a scaled 
likelihood judgment would de-bias participants and subsequently rein in 
their behavior (see Bouts & Van Avermaet, 1992, for an analogous example 
in which the biasing influence of familiarity was observed on betting deci-
sions, except when likelihood judgments were solicited first).
(block) ANOVA on the desirability-bias composites (calcu-
lated per block) revealed that the desirability bias did not
significantly differ as a function of order (p= .67). The
composites for the bias were significantly above 50%
regardless of whether choices were solicited before
(M=54.7%, SD=11.2%) or after (M=55.5%, SD=14.4%)
likelihood judgments (both ps< .01). The 2×2×2 ANOVA
also revealed no significant effect of block (p= .18), nor
were there any interactions (ps> .37). The only significant
main effect was an unimportant effect of the location
counterbalancing condition (i.e., whether jokes first
appeared on the left or right; p= .02).
Likelihood judgments
We rescored the likelihood judgments such that 5 reflected
high certainty and 1 low certainty about the desirable out-
come. Despite the fact that the critical trials all involved grids
containing 50/50 proportions, the middle response option on
the likelihood scale was selected in only 49% of trials
overall. In other words, there was notable variability in
how people viewed the likelihoods of outcomes when they
examined the grids.
More important was whether there was a desirability bias.
The effect was significant, which was not expected, but it
was small. The overall mean on the critical trials (M=3.05,
SD=0.21) was slightly greater than 3—the midpoint of the
scale, t(135) = 2.94, p= .004, d=0.24. As with behavior, a 2
(order) × 2 (counterbalance) × 2 (block) ANOVA revealed
that likelihood judgments did not significantly differ as a
function of order (p= .99) or block (p= .11). The only signi-
ficant effect was again an unimportant main effect for
location counterbalancing (p= .01).
Figure 3. Example of the matrix and instructions participants saw before a trial in Study 3
other. The 5-point response scale ranged from very likely to 
go [color of right side] to very likely to go [color of left side] 
and was presented vertically on the screen. After providing 
their responses on a given trial, participants proceeded to 
the next trial without seeing which side the slider selected or 
the number of points earned/lost in a given trial. This feed-
back was provided later, and all participants saw eight jokes 
and answered eight math problems at the end of the study.
Post-game measures
To more closely examine the impact of specific color 
pairings on the perceived proportions on the grids, we added 
six testing trials after the game. In each trial, participants 
viewed one of the grids and color pairings. Each square of 
a given color also contained an “M” or “J” (fully 
counterbalanced). After 4 seconds, the grid disappeared, 
and participants were asked to indicate which color was more 
frequent on the grid.
Participants also completed the LOT-R scale (Scheier 
et al., 1994), the Numeracy scale (Lipkus et al., 2001), the 
Behavioral Inhibition and Activation Scale (BIS/BAS; 
Carver & White, 1994), and the Belief in Good Luck Scale 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997). Scores from these scales were 
not significantly correlated with our key measures and will 
not be discussed further.
Results
Behavior
Overall, there was a significant desirability bias for behavior
—the rate at which participants chose the desirable side to 
prepare on critical trials was 55.1% (SD =12.8%),  t(135) 
= 4.62, p< .001, d = 0.40. A 2 (order) × 2 (counterbalance) × 2
were more visually salient. On seven of 12 critical trials,
one color from a pair (i.e., the side associated with that color)
was predicted significantly more than the other color and was
given a higher likelihood estimate (ps< .05). Also, on five of
the six post-game trials, there was a significant bias toward
one color over the other (ps< .05). In virtually all these cases
of imbalance, the lighter color in the grid was predicted or
seemed more likely/frequent than the darker colors. Again,
these findings are orthogonal to our main findings. Another
notable finding from the post-game trials was that colors
were judged as more frequent when their squares contained
the letter “J” (chosen on 56% of the post-game trials) rather
than “M.” We highly doubt that this, itself, is a visual
salience effect. Instead, it likely reflects carryover from the
previous 16 trials they experienced, in which “J” was always
signifying the potential for a more desirable outcome. In a
similar study that used grids but did not display Ms or Js
(and involved no likelihood judgments), the basic desir-
ability bias on behavior was replicated, providing additional
reason to believe that the letters are not critical to the
desirability bias observed in this study.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 extend the generalizability of the find-
ings from Study 2 in at least three ways. First, even when
participants were given concrete information about the like-
lihood of desirable outcomes (via the grids), they still exhib-
ited a significant desirability bias in their behavior. Second,
we used jokes and math problems to manipulate desirability
rather than points gained or lost. This change addresses a
potential criticism of Study 2, which is that the reward earned
by clicking on the right circles is the same currency as the de-
sirability manipulation (i.e., the currency is points for both).
Third, the desirability bias replicated with a dichotomous
measure of behavior. In this study, we also solicited likeli-
hood judgments, counterbalanced with measures of behavior.
As expected, the effect of desire on the behavior measure
was stronger than that on the likelihood measure, but the
difference was smaller than anticipated. The effect of desire
on likelihood judgments was significant. This issue is again
addressed in the next two studies.
STUDY 4
Studies 2 and 3 assessed real behavior, rather than hypothe-
tical behavior, to test for a desirability bias. However, the tar-
get events and other aspects of the computer game used in
those studies (e.g., the repeated measures) could be consi-
dered abstract or artificial. In Studies 4 and 5, we again
examined the effect of desirability on real rather than hypo-
thetical behavior, but with a paradigm in which there was
only one event being considered, the evidence regarding
outcomes of the event was richer and less contrived than grid
colors, and the preparation behavior being measured was
more concrete.
The event that was used was a videotaped college basket-
ball game. Before participants watched footage from the
Behavior versus likelihood judgments
Not surprisingly, participants’ choices and likelihood judg-
ments were associated. For each participant, we calculated 
the Fisher-transformed idiographic correlation across trials 
between likelihood judgments and choices (both scored so 
higher values favor the desirable side). The correlations 
tended to be high and significantly greater than zero regard-
less of whether choices (Mr = 0.66; t(64) = 18.02, p < .001) 
or likelihood judgments (Mr = 0.66, t(60) = 17.67, p < .001) 
were solicited first.
Various analyses provided conflicting conclusions about 
whether the effect of desire on behavior should be considered 
at least partially independent of its effect on likelihood judg-
ment. To directly compare the magnitude of the desirability 
bias on behavior versus on likelihood judgments, we first 
calculated, for each participant, the proportion of times the 
left side was picked when it was desirable and when it was 
undesirable. We standardized those scores. Next, we calcu-
lated for each participant the mean likelihood estimate for 
when the left side was desirable and for when it was undesir-
able (with scores coded such that high values meant high 
perceived likelihood of the left side). We standardized these 
scores. These four sets of scores were submitted to a 2 
(desirability) × 2 (type of measure) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
A significant interaction revealed that the effect of desir-
ability was larger on behavior than on likelihood judgments,
F(1, 135) = 4.75, p = .03, ηp 2 = 0.03.
We also conducted mediation analyses using participant-
level data and the guidelines defined by Judd, Kenny, and 
McClelland (2001) for within-subject designs. Participants’ 
tendency to give higher likelihood estimates for a given side 
when the side was desired (vs. not) was strongly correlated 
with their tendency to prepare for that side when it was de-
sired (vs. not), r = .60, p < .001. Given this tight relationship, 
it is not surprising that the mediation analyses returned results 
that were consistent with the idea that the effect of desirability 
on likelihood judgment partially mediated the effect of 
desirability on behavior. However, the causal interpretation 
of the pattern is not clear (e.g., a third variable explanation 
is that participants who most cared about outcome desirability 
were the most likely to exhibit a strong desirability effect on 
both their likelihood judgments and behaviors).
Finally, we also found that when examining only trials in 
which a given participant had responded with the middle 
likelihood judgment, participants chose to prepare the desired 
side at an average rate of 56%, which is significantly greater 
than 50%, t(129) = 3.13, p = .002, d = 0.27. That is, even on 
trials in which likelihood judgments were all the same (and 
neutral), a desirability bias in behavior was evident.
Influence of color pairings and letters
The analyses reported earlier collapsed across a 
counterbalancing of which color in a given pair was associ-
ated with the desired side/outcome. This ensured that color 
pairings were orthogonal to the results of the desire manipu-
lations. Nonetheless, we briefly report here on an interesting 
effect of color revealed by examining results at the individual 
trial level. In short, it appears that lighter colors in the grid
before time ran out. The video was paused with 10 seconds
left in the game, and participants were asked to complete
the dependent measures in a counterbalanced order (either
behavior, prediction, likelihood judgment or likelihood
judgment, behavior, prediction).
For the behavioral measure, participants were informed
that after the game was over, they would have to complete
a timed task of writing poetic sentences that include rhyming
words related to a specific theme. If the red team won, the
required theme would be “afternoon at the park,” but if the
white team won, the required theme would be “afternoon at
the pool.” They then read:
Don’t worry, this isn’t a high-pressure thing, but you’ll do
better at the poetic-sentences task if you prepare some rhyme
words in advance. Right now, we are going to give you 2mi-
nutes to prepare rhyme words for either the ‘Park’ or the
‘Pool’ theme…You have to pick a theme to prepare for even
though you don’t know for sure what theme is relevant.
Then participants were prompted to click on one of two
buttons to indicate the theme for which they would prepare:
“the ‘pool’ theme (relevant if the white team happens to
win)” or “the ‘park’ theme (relevant if the red team happens
to win).”
For the prediction measure, participants were asked
“What is your prediction about the outcome of the game?
That is, which team do you think will win?”
For the likelihood measures, participants were asked
separately about both the red and white teams’ likelihood
of being the winner. They responded to each by selecting
one of seven likelihood phrases on a scale from extremely
unlikely to extremely likely.
Next, participants generated rhymes and then responded
to a variety of questions about their experience viewing the
game, how they made their decision, how desirable the
reward was, whether they consider themselves an optimist
or pessimist, their perceptions of the experiment, and if they
could remember the team names. They completed the LOT-R
(Scheier et al., 1994), Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and BIS/BAS (Carver &
White, 1994). They watched the final 10 seconds of the
game, followed by doing an untimed rhyming task and being
debriefed.
Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses did not reveal noteworthy results re-
garding the additional questions and trait scales encountered
by participants at the end of the session, so with one excep-
tion, those results are not discussed further. Table 1 displays
means for the behavior, prediction, and perceived likelihood
measures.
Behavior
A full 86.6% of participants chose to prepare for the rhyming
task associated with their desired outcome—that is, with their
teaming winning. Not only is this proportion significantly
greater than 50% (binomial test, p< .001), it is also decidedly
game, we introduced a desirability manipulation. Namely, 
participants were randomly assigned to be associated with 
one team or the other; if “their” team won, they would re-
ceive a candy bar. Prior to finding out how the game ended, 
participants also learned that they would soon be doing one 
of two versions of an unrelated task—depending on the game 
outcome. The unrelated task was timed and involved gene-
rating poetic sentences related to a pool theme or park theme. 
As our main dependent variable, we gave participants a 
chance to prepare a list of rhyme words associated with one 
of the two themes—a list that might be useful for later gene-
rating the poetic sentences. Optimally, a participant should 
prepare rhyme words for the theme that seems most likely 
(given the state of the basketball game) or perhaps for the 
theme that seems more difficult. However, the outcome of 
the game was uncertain, and the two themes were designed 
to seem roughly equally difficult. In short, we set up a 
situation that we thought might be conducive to detecting a 
biasing influence of outcome desirability. We predicted that 
participants would be biased toward preparing as if the 
desired team was going to win (i.e., they would prepare for 
the rhyming task that would be relevant if their team won).
Participants were also asked to estimate the likelihood of 
the two possible game outcomes—either before or after 
deciding which rhyming task to prepare for. Soliciting these 
likelihood judgments provided another opportunity to com-
pare the effect of desirability on behavior versus likelihood 
judgment. Based on the mixed literature regarding the effect 
of desirability on likelihood judgment, we did not expect a 
robust effect on likelihood judgments in this study. Dichoto-
mous predictions about the game outcome were also 
solicited. For reasons discussed earlier, we expected predic-




Ninety-seven undergraduate students at the University of 
Iowa participated in a 2 (desired team: red, white) × 2 (order: 
behavior first, likelihood judgments first) between-subjects 
design.
Procedure, materials, and dependent measures 
Participants were told that they would be watching a 
videotaped basketball game and that one of the teams would 
be designated as “their” team. If “their” team won the game, 
they would receive a candy bar. In view of each participant, 
the experimenter flipped a coin to assign the participant to 
either the red-jersey team (if heads) or the white-jersey team 
(if tails). Participants then watched footage from the last 
several minutes of a game from the 2010 tournament of the 
Women’s Northeast College Basketball Conference. We 
selected this particular game because it was unlikely that 
any of our participants would know about the outcome and 
because the score was very close in the last few seconds. 
One team had stormed back from being further behind, but 
it was unclear whether that team would overtake the other
tendency was not evident in either behavior or predictions
(binomial test ps> .68; Table 1).
For each participant, we combined the two likelihood
estimates into one composite—namely, a difference score
reflecting the extent to which his or her estimate for the de-
sired team was larger than for the other team. The average
composite estimate was 0.43 (SD=1.93), which was greater
than 0 and represents a small but significant desirability
bias, t(96) = 2.22, p= .03, d=0.22. Given the earlier-
described main effect in which participants gave higher
likelihood estimates for the red versus white team, it is not
surprising that the composite estimate for the desirability
bias was higher when the desired team was red (M=1.02,
SD=1.45) than white (M=0.24, SD=2.19), t(74.5)
= 3.30, p< .001, d=0.68. More important, the composite
estimate for the desirability bias was about the same regard-
less of whether likelihood judgments were solicited before
or after behavior, t(95) = 0.52, p= .61, d=0.11.
Correlations, comparison, and mediation analysis
For all analyses reported in this section, we coded all of the
relevant variables (desire, likelihood estimates, behavior,
and predictions) in a similar direction (higher values meant
higher desire for, likelihood estimates favoring, behavior
consistent with, and prediction of the red team winning).
We first examined the relations among the three depen-
dent measures. As expected, behavior and predictions were
tightly correlated (rφ= .88, p< .001), whereas the correlation
between behavior and likelihood judgments (r= .34,
p< .001) was significantly smaller (p< .001 for the compa-
rison based on Lee & Preacher, 2013). The correlation
between likelihood judgments and predictions was also
relatively small (r= .38, p< .001).
Next, we examined correlations between the desirability
variable and the various dependent variables, to allow for
comparisons of the effect magnitudes. Redundant with
earlier results, the correlations between the desire variable
and behavior (rφ= .73, p< .001), predictions (rϕ = .69,
p< .001), and likelihood judgments (r= .21, p= .04) were
all significant. Comparison of these values reveals that the
effect of desire was larger on behavior and predictions than
on likelihood judgments (both ps< .001; based on Lee &
Preacher, 2013).
Finally, we conducted a mediation analysis using the
PROCESS macro in SPSS (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA) with
10, 000 bootstrap samples and Model 4 (Hayes, 2013,
2014). The desirability manipulation was the independent
variable, likelihood judgment was the potential mediator,
and behavior was the dependent variable. The 95%
confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include
zero, B(SE) = 0.39 (0.32) [0.02, 1.29], which suggests some
degree of mediation. However, the confidence interval for
the direct effect also did not contain zero, B(SE) = 3.91
(0.67) [2.59, 5.24]. This suggests that there is a significant
effect of desire on behavior, even after accounting for









% Preparing for a red-
team win
86.5 13.3 52.6
% Preparing for a
white-team win
13.5 86.7 47.4
% Predicting a red-
team win
84.6 15.6 52.6






5.08 (0.81) 4.49 (1.31) 4.80 (1.11)
Mean likelihood estimate
of white-team win (SD)
4.06 (1.04) 4.24 (1.32) 4.14 (1.17)
Table 1. Percentages, means, and standard deviations for dependent 
measures in Study 4
Note: Percentages are in pairs and add to 100. For example, 86.5% of the 
people who were told the red team was “their team” (i.e., red winning was 
desired) prepared for the rhyming task associated with the red team winning, 
while the remainder of those people (13.5%) prepared for the rhyming task 
associated with the white team winning.
stronger than the conceptually comparable rate observed in 
Study 3 (55.1%). This tendency to prepare as if the desired 
outcome would occur was not qualified by the counter-
balancing of whether it was the red or white team that was 
made desirable, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .99. It was also not qualified 
by whether behavior was measured before (rate = 84.3%) or 
after (rate = 89.1%) likelihood judgments were solicited, 
χ2(1) = 0.48, p = .49.
Predictions
The pattern of results for predictions was the same as for 
behavior. A full 84.5% of participants predicted that their 
desired team would win the game, significantly greater than 
50% (binomial test, p < .001). Again, this tendency was not 
significantly qualified by the counterbalancing of whether it 
was the red or white team that was made desirable, χ2(1) 
= 0.001, p = .98, nor whether predictions were measured 
before or after likelihood judgments were solicited, χ2(1) 
= 0.25, p = .62.
Likelihood judgments
Recall that participants gave separate likelihood estimates of 
the red team and white team winning. Preliminary analyses 
revealed two notable findings. First, there was a significant 
inverse correlation between these two estimates (r = .33, 
p = .001), which is not surprising given the formal comple-
mentarity of the focal outcomes in these two questions. Sec-
ond, participants tended to give higher estimates for the red 
team (M = 4.80, SD = 1.11) than the white team (M = 4.14, 
SD = 1.17), t(96) = 3.50, p < .001. This effect could be attri-
buted to any of a large number of factors that we cannot 
pinpoint (e.g., the red team was ahead; the color red might 
inspire more confidence); we will also simply note that this
Results
Results from manipulation check confirmed that participants
cared about the outcome and in the expected direction. The
response options on that item ranged from 1= definitely hope
red wins to 5 = definitely hope white wins. Only 11.5% of
participants gave the middle response, which was labeled
“don’t care.” The mean response was significantly higher
among participants for whom the coin flip made the white
team “theirs” (M=4.54, SD=0.60) rather than the red team
(M=1.73, SD=0.88), t(126.81) = 21.56, p< .001, d=3.73.
Other preliminary analyses did not reveal noteworthy results
regarding trait scales or the additional questions encountered
by participants at the end of the session, so those results are
not discussed further. Table 2 displays means for the beha-
vior, prediction, and perceived likelihood measures.
Behavior
The effect of desirability on behavior was replicated in this
study, although the effect was smaller in magnitude. A sig-
nificant majority of participants (57.7%) prepared as if the
desired outcome would happen (p= .04 from a one-tailed
binomial test). That is, they chose an article that reflected
preparation for the speech that would be required if their
team won. This tendency was not significantly qualified by
either the team counterbalancing (red vs. white; p= .41) or
the order counterbalancing (before or after likelihood
judgments; p= .11). Because of a general overall tendency
to prepare for the topic of winning, participants were more
likely to prepare for their team winning when they were
addressing their team (67.2%) as compared with when they
were addressing the opposing team (48.5%), χ2(1) = 4.66,
p= .03. This finding, while interesting, should not detract
from the main result reflecting an overall tendency to prepare
for the desired outcome.
Table 2. Percentages, means, and standard deviations for dependent









% Preparing for a red-
team win
60.8 46.4 54.6
% Preparing for a
white-team win
39.2 53.6 45.4
% Predicting a red-
team win
62.2 23.2 45.4






4.76 (1.03) 4.70 (0.99) 4.73 (1.01)
Mean likelihood estimate
of white-team win (SD)
3.93 (1.04) 4.41 (0.99) 4.14 (1.04)
Note: Percentages are in pairs and add to 100. For example, 60.8% of the
people who were told the red team was “their team” (i.e., red winning was
desired) prepared for the speech associated with the red team winning, while
the remainder of those people (39.2%) prepared for the speech associated
with the white team winning.
STUDY 5
The use of the dynamic basketball game as the uncertain out-
come in Study 4 was, from an ecological-validity standpoint, 
an improvement over Studies 2 and 3. However, the basket-
ball outcome was arbitrarily paired with a type of rhyming 
task. While allowing the study to maintain high internal 
validity, this arbitrary pairing might be considered peculiar 
and therefore a limitation. In Study 5, we removed this 
limitation by telling participants that the outcome of the 
game influenced whether they would be assigned to give a 
short speech about “how to win graciously” or “lessons in 
losing.” Participants were then faced with a choice about 
whether to read information that would help them prepare 
for the former topic or the latter topic.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred thirty undergraduate students at the University 
of Iowa participated in a 2 (speech target: your team, the op-
posing team) × 2 (desired team: red, white) × 2 (order: behav-
ior first, likelihood judgments first) between-subjects design.
Procedure, materials, and dependent measures
All procedures and materials were identical to Study 4 except 
as described here. In place of the rhyming task from Study 4, 
participants were told that depending on the outcome of the 
game, they would be required to give an audio-recorded 
speech about either “how to win graciously” or “lessons in 
losing.” Half of the participants were told that their speech 
would be addressed to their own team—so if they won, they 
would talk about winning, but if their team lost, they would 
talk about losing. The other half of the participants were told 
that their speech would be addressed to the opposing team—
so if their team won, they would give a speech about losing, 
but if their team lost, they would talk about winning. This 
manipulation was necessary in order to counterbalance 
which speech topic was associated with the desired outcome 
(i.e., the participant’s own team winning).
For the behavior measure in this study, participants were 
given an opportunity to read one of two possible articles 
(prior to knowing the game’s outcome). Participants chose 
between reading “Things Good Winners Do,” clearly helpful 
for preparing a speech about winning, and “The Upside of 
Losing,” helpful for preparing a speech about losing.
The participants did indeed deliver audio-recorded 
speeches at the end study, but we made this a less stressful 
experience than what most participants had probably been 
expecting. Each participant did this in private using a 
hand-held recording device. The speeches were erased after 
each session. We added a manipulation check: “Which team 
do you hope will win?” Two other new measures inquired 
about the usefulness of the articles participants received 
and the difficulty of giving the speech.
Discussion
The key finding in the previous study was replicated in the
current one—participants were more likely to prepare as if
the desired outcome rather than undesired outcome was about
to happen. Recall that we switched to the speech-preparation
task in this study for improved ecological validity of the
behavior measure. Anecdotal observations of participants
revealed that they were concerned about optimizing their
preparation (e.g., they read their chosen article carefully and
expressed cogent rationales for their article selections). The
desirability manipulation was just one of many possible
reasons (unconfounded with desire) for selecting to prepare
for one speech topic or another (e.g., knowing less about
one topic than the other; feeling that one topic is more impor-
tant or interesting). Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that
the overall magnitude of the desirability effect on behavior in
this study is smaller than in Study 4.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We began by asking if normatively irrelevant desires would
influence how people prepare when faced with an event with
an uncertain outcome. We found consistent evidence that
people tend to allow the desirability of a key outcome to
influence their behavior. They are more likely to act in
anticipation of a desired outcome than an undesired one.
We showed this over the course of five studies using three
distinct paradigms. Study 1 and a follow-up involved hypo-
thetical scenarios of an everyday situation with an uncertain
and uncontrollable outcome. Studies 2 and 3 used a computer
game to measure immediate behavior in the context of the
game. In Study 2, participants prepared more circles on the
side of the screen that they hoped an unpredictable slider
would go, even though this biased behavior could not influ-
ence the final outcome and was a generally inferior strategy.
Study 3 replicated this finding using a new desire manipula-
tion (reading a joke vs. solving a difficult math problem) and
using grids to communicate likelihood information to partic-
ipants. For Studies 4 and 5, we used a much different target
event—a college basketball game. Both studies, which
varied in the preparation task and options presented to
participants, revealed that participants’ preparation choices
depended on outcome desirability.
Our results extend conclusions suggested by studies that
have assessed betting behavior within the context of the
marked card paradigm (e.g., Irwin & Snodgrass, 1966; Pruitt
& Hoge, 1965). As discussed earlier, a potential limitation
when drawing conclusions from those studies is that money
is used for both the bet and the desirability manipulation,
which makes it very obvious to participants that betting on
the undesirable outcome would be hedging or betting against
the self. It would ensure the gain of a desirable draw would
be cut by the loss from the misplaced bet. The present
research does not involve bets nor monetary incentives.
The hedonic values of outcome desirability and of prepara-
tion behavior came in entirely different currencies—with
the exception of Study 2, where the desire manipulation
and the reward for successful action both involved earning
Predictions
Again, as expected, a significant majority of participants 
(68.5%) predicted that their desired team would win the 
game (p < .001, binomial test). This tendency was not signi-
ficantly qualified by the team counterbalancing (p = .08), the 
order counterbalancing (p = .57), nor whether the speech was 
supposed to address their own team or the opposing team 
(p = .11).
Likelihood judgments
The average difference between participants’ likelihood 
estimates for the desired and undesired teams was 0.35 
(SD = 1.68), which was greater than 0 and represents a small 
but significant desirability bias, t(129) = 2.35, p = .02, 
d = 0.21. As in Study 4, the composite was higher when the 
desired team was red (M = 0.82, SD = 1.61) than white 
(M = 0.28, SD = 1.55; p < .001). In a borderline effect 
(p = .07), the composite was larger when estimates were 
solicited before behavior (M = 0.62, SD = 1.59) rather than 
after (M = 0.08, SD = 1.73). There was no significant effect 
of whether the speech was addressed to the participants’ team 
or the opposing team (p = .93).
Correlations, comparison, and mediation analysis
To examine the relations among the three dependent mea-
sures, we again coded the relevant variables in the same 
direction (Study 4). The correlation between behavior and 
predictions was significant (rφ = .43, p < .001) and was again
stronger than the correlation between behavior and likeli-
hood judgments (r = .18, p = .04; p = .02 for the comparison 
based on Lee & Preacher, 2013). The correlation between 
likelihood judgments and predictions was again moderate 
(r = .47, p < .001).
Next, we compared the effects of desirability by comput-
ing correlations between the desirability variable and the 
various dependent variables. Unlike Study 4, the effect of
desire on behavior (rφ = .14, p = .10) was about the same as 
the effect on likelihood judgments (r = .17, p = .06). The only 
significant difference in effects was that the effect on predic-
tions (rφ = .39, p < .001) was greater than the effects on either 
behavior or likelihood judgment (both ps < .05; based on Lee 
& Preacher, 2013). A similar pattern of correlations was 
found when we replaced the dichotomous independent 
variable with the continuous manipulation check variable 
(i.e., “Which team do you hope will win?”). The correlations 
of that variable with behavior, likelihood judgments, and 
predictions were .17, .18, and .40, respectively (all ps < .05 
with one-tailed tests).
We conducted another mediation analysis using PRO-
CESS Model 4 to determine whether likelihood judgments 
mediated the relationship between desire and behavior 
(Hayes, 2013). Perhaps owing to weaker overall effects of 
desirability in this study relative to Study 4, neither the direct 
nor indirect effects were statistically significant.
likelihood judgments were significant in all three of our stud-
ies is somewhat surprising, given that researchers have had
only limited success in detecting such effects on likelihood
judgments (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bilgin, 2012; Price
& Marquez, 2005; Scherer, Windschitl, O’Rourke, & Smith,
2012; Vosgerau, 2010; Windschitl et al., 2013; for a review
see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).
The desirability biases on likelihood judgments also com-
plicate the analysis of whether our results were consistent
with an extension of the biased-guessing account. Recall that
the account was originally developed to explain documented
differences between the sensitivity of likelihood judgments
and predictions to desirability biases (Windschitl et al.,
2010). The account suggests that when evidence is not deci-
sive, dichotomous outcome predictions can involve hunches
or guesswork that are subjectively arbitrary, and this allows
for people to insert optimism into their prediction even if
they would not exhibit optimism in their likelihood judg-
ments. Likelihood judgments involve scaled responses based
on available evidence and may prompt a respondent to think
about the probability of potential outcomes relatively deeply,
leaving little room for the insertion of hunches or guesses
(Windschitl et al., 2010).
Because desirability impacted not only behavior but also
likelihood judgments in Studies 3–5, the findings do not fit
a simplistic pattern (i.e., null effects of likelihood judgments
and significant effects on behavior). Nevertheless, several
analyses examining differences between behaviors and likeli-
hood judgments are generally consistent with an extension of
the biased-guessing account. First, in Studies 3 and 4, the
magnitude of the desirability bias was larger for behaviors
than for likelihood judgments. Second, in the two studies in
which predictions were measured, behaviors and predictions
were more tightly correlated than were behavior and likeli-
hood judgments. Third, in Study 4, the direct effect of desir-
ability on behavior was significant—that is, desirability
impacted behavior even after accounting for the biasing
effect through likelihood judgment. The application of the
biased-guessing account to behavior requires additional
work, but the present findings, particularly Studies 3 and 4,
provide initial backing for idea that the impact of outcome
desirability on behavior is not limited by its impact on likeli-
hood judgment. Although wishful thinking (the causal effect
of desirability on likelihood judgment) has been difficult to
detect and even considered “elusive” (Bar-Hillel & Budescu,
1995), wishful behavior might be more prominent and less
elusive.
Future work
In studies on risky choices between gambles, people often
reject equal-probability gambles in which the chances of
gaining or losing a given amount of money are the same.
For these choices, people do not seem to be inclined to be-
have optimistically—as though uncertainty will be resolved
in the desired way. These instances are generally attributed
to an asymmetry in the subjective evaluations of gains and
losses (the value function in prospect theory; Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). If the
points. Yet, in all studies, participants still engaged in actions 
that anticipated their desired outcome.
The direction of our results was not a fait accompli. As  
discussed earlier, various perspectives suggest that desire 
for an outcome could produce behavior that is, or appears 
to be, pessimistic. In our studies involving real rather than 
hypothetical outcomes (Studies 2–5), the key outcomes faced 
by participants were impending rather than distant. Although 
previous work has shown that optimism fades (or pessimism 
grows) as an outcome draws nearer, participants in our stud-
ies were still impacted in an optimistic rather than pessimistic 
direction by the desirability manipulations (Gilovich et al., 
1993; Shepperd et al., 1996; Shepperd et al., 2000; Tyler & 
Rosier, 2009; for a review, see Sweeny & Krizan, 2013). 
Previous studies on how optimism changes over time have 
not specifically manipulated desirability and measured its 
impact on behavior regarding impending outcomes, which 
make the present work unique. It was also possible that 
participants in our studies would adopt a pessimistic position 
because of asymmetric loss functions (the downsides to 
acting optimistically—e.g., risking disappointment—were 
worse than the downsides of acting pessimistically; Haselton 
& Nettle, 2006; Shepperd et al., 1996; Sweeny et al., 2006; 
Weber, 1994; Weber & Hilton, 1990). The direction of the 
effects in our studies was not consistent with the direction 
that this interpretation of asymmetric loss functions would 
suggest. Finally, although concerns about tempting fate 
might affect some people on some occasions, such concerns 
did not—at the level of a main effect—make our participants 
avoid responding to the desirability manipulations in an opti-
mistic direction (Miller & Taylor, 1995; Risen & Gilovich, 
2007, 2008; Swirsky et al., 2011; Van Wolferen et al., 
2013). As discussed earlier, previous studies on tempting fate 
have focused on manipulating whether a protagonist tempts 
fate rather than on the impact of desirability manipulations.
Despite the very consistent pattern of optimism across our 
five studies, we do not wish to claim that optimism will 
always be observed rather than its alternatives of pessimism 
or a reluctance to tempt fate. There were features of our 
scenarios and experiments that may have been especially 
conducive to optimism. For example, in the five studies 
presented here, the stakes were not very high, and the conse-
quences of behavior that could be construed as “tempting 
fate” were not very severe. Some research suggests that 
people are more likely to display optimism for events with 
minor consequences as opposed to events with severe conse-
quences (Lench & Bench, 2014; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998) 
and that people are willing to exhibit greater optimism when 
the consequences of being inaccurate are less severe (Armor 
& Taylor, 2002). Consequently, if we increased the stakes at 
play in the present studies, the results might (or might not) 
shift to show more pessimism or a reluctance to tempt fate.
Likelihood judgments and the biased-guessing account 
Three of the experiments (Studies 3–5) included likelihood 
judgments as dependent measures. The effects of desirability 
on likelihood judgments were small but significant in all of 
these studies. The fact that the desirability biases on
events might underlie optimism and perceived likelihoods
(Lench, 2009). In recent work by Lench and Darbor
(2014), the negative affect associated with a negative health
risk was manipulated via a subliminal priming procedure.
Negative affective associations were related to not only
decreased perceived risk but also a reduced tendency to take
information about reducing the risk. This intriguing finding
parallels our findings but with affect as the manipulated
variable, and the finding is consistent with the notion that
affect may play a key role in the effects of desirability.
While we see promise in these two possible explanations
for why people might lean toward optimistic behavior, many
other possibilities exist (for additional ideas, see Helweg-
Larsen, Sadeghian, & Webb, 2002; Krizan & Windschitl,
2007; Sharot, 2011; Shepperd, Carroll, Grace, & Terry,
2002; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tyler & Rosier, 2009).
Conclusion
Studying the causal impact of outcome desirability on beha-
vior is most directly accomplished by using an experimental
manipulation of desirability for an outcome that is not
controllable. Our five studies did just that, across three quite
different paradigms. They were consistent in revealing
optimistic biases on behavior. Wishful behavior might be
relatively common in everyday contexts. Returning to our
opening example, it may be that the employee’s desire to
participate in the summer traineeship prompts him or her to
place a deposit on an apartment whereas a colleague who
does not want the position may avoid researching apartments
altogether until he or she knows for sure.
APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 FULL SCENARIO—
MANIPULATION IN ITALICS
Imagine your house sits in a wooded area with a park behind
it. Your city is planning construction of a public pool. One of
the potential sites for the pool is in the park behind your
house.
[You and your family are super excited about potentially
having this pool so close to your house. Your kids, who love
swimming and have been begging you to put a pool in your
own backyard, would love having such easy access. The pro-
posed plans for the pool look great. The other possible sites
for the pool would be much less convenient for your family./
You and your family hate the idea of having this pool so close
to your house. You are concerned about the non-stop noise
that would emanate from the pool and the heavy foot traffic
that it would generate. It would also ruin the beautiful view
you currently have of the park and the glare of the lights at
night would keep you and your family up. The other
possible sites for the pool seem much better for your family.]
The city council already voted to construct the pool in the
park behind your house. Therefore, this will be the site of the
pool if the results of foundation testing on that site, scheduled
in 4months, are positive. However, there is uncertainty about
how the foundation testing will turn out. The engineer in
gain–loss asymmetry were held constant, might signs of 
nonindependence between outcome valence and subjective 
probability be seen? It is possible that people would be 
inclined to take an equal-probability gamble (a choice that 
might appear optimistic) except for the fact that the antici-
pated pain of losing the specific amount is greater than the an-
ticipated enjoyment of winning it. However, recent empirical 
work by Bilgin (2012) is at odds with this possibility (also 
Vosgerau, 2010). Bilgin also suggests that outcome valence 
and subjective probability are not independent, but he argues 
that losses, rather than gains, “loom more likely.” Our work 
and Bilgin’s raise some intriguing issues regarding noninde-
pendence between outcome valence and subjective prob-
ability. Resolving them is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but the issues are clearly worthy of further investigation.
Our studies focused on situations in which the evidence 
for one outcome over the other was indecisive. Based on 
related empirical work (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) and 
theoretical conceptions such as the biased-guessing account 
(Windschitl et al., 2010), these situations are primary candi-
dates for observing a desirability bias. Finding bias in these 
situations is important, because life is full of situations in 
which available evidence is highly indecisive—because evi-
dence is largely missing, the determining event is perceived 
as random, and/or evidence is well balanced (supports both 
outcomes about equally). Further research should systemati-
cally explore the mitigation of the desirability bias as 
evidence shifts from being otherwise indecisive to decisive.
More research should also be aimed at the underlying 
question of why people might tend to take an optimistic 
stance rather than a pessimistic one in their behavior. The 
biased-guessing account is primarily about when bias will 
be observed, and it is shallow in its explanation of why the 
bias falls in an optimistic rather than pessimistic direction. 
Here, we will mention two possible explanations regarding 
the direction of bias in people’s behavior in preparation or 
anticipation of an outcome. First, perhaps people are simply 
overgeneralizing from the multitude of situations in which 
they have control over key outcomes. For many events in 
their daily lives, people have control over the outcomes and 
are accustomed to behaving in such a way to make a desired 
outcome happen. For example, when a student desperately 
wants an “A” on a test, the student can study intensely in 
preparation for that test, thereby making the “A” more likely. 
This logic does not rationally apply to specific cases in which 
people have no control over the target outcomes (as tested in 
our studies), but because of simple overgeneralization, peo-
ple might be prone to behave as if they have control—
thereby appearing overoptimistic about the desired outcome.
A second possible explanation refers to the potential 
averseness of preparing for an undesired outcome. Preparing 
for such an outcome might be affectively negative because it 
serves to remind people of something they hope to avoid. For 
example, making detailed travel arrangements for a work-
related trip that one hopes will be unnecessary might be 
aversive and less likely to get done because the act of making 
the arrangements brings to mind how unpleasant such travel 
would be. This idea is related to research on how positive 
and negative affective reactions to desirable and undesirable
charge of the test says that it is very hard to tell in advance if
the testing will indicate that the site is suitable.
If the pool is built, you will be required by the city to
make some landscaping changes to the back end of your
property, which would normally cost about $900. Because
of a project that your neighbor is currently doing, you would
be able to make the changes at a huge discount. The crew
would already be there and you would be able to use some
of the same materials, so the project would cost about 70%
less than if you brought in a new crew after the results of
the foundation testing came back.
APPENDIX B: FULL SCENARIO OF DOG PARK
STUDY
Imagine you have recently bought a house with a small yard.
Behind it is a grassy area. Your city is planning construction
of a dog park.
The city council already voted to put the dog park in the
grassy area behind your back yard. However, this plan
depends on whether the results of environmental-impact
testing are positive. There is uncertainty about how the
environmental-impact testing will be positive and allow for
the dog park. The person conducting the test says that it is
very hard to tell in advance how the dog park might impact
the area. They will need to survey the ecosystem of the grassy
area, and it will be a few months before the results are in.
If the dog park is built, you will be required by the city to
make some landscaping changes to the back end of your
property, which would normally cost about $900. Because
of a project that your neighbor is currently doing, you would
be able to make the changes at a huge discount. The crew
would already be there and you would be able to use some
of the same materials, so the project would cost about 60%
less than if you brought in a new crew after the results of
the environmental-impact testing came back.
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